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LANE V. FRANKS 
Supreme Court Rules on First Amendment Speech Protections 
for Government Employees 
Katie Jo Baumgardner* 
The role that the First Amendment plays in the public workplace is 
one of particular importance.  Given that almost twenty-two million 
Americans work for the local, state, and federal governments, the 
constitutional protections afforded to public employees is of particular 
interest to public employers and employees, and the audiences who might 
learn from employees’ speech.1  Unlike the constitutional protections 
granted to private citizen speech, the Supreme Court’s First Amendment 
public employee speech jurisprudence provides public employees with a 
constrained and “limited set of First Amendment freedoms.”2  Although the 
law grants public employees some First Amendment protection, “their 
speech is afforded a lower degree of constitutional protection as compared 
with the speech of private citizens.”3  Notably, these free speech rights 
most often become more controversial when an employee faces discipline 
because of his or her speech.4 
On June 19, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court expanded the scope of 
public employee free speech with its decision in Lane v. Franks.5  The 
Court granted certiorari in order “to resolve discord among the Courts of 
Appeals as to whether public employees may be fired—or suffer other 
adverse employment consequences—for providing truthful subpoenaed 
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 1  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2013 ANNUAL SURVEY OF PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT & PAYROLL, 
CATEGORIES OF EMPLOYEES AT THE FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL LEVELS (2014) (reporting 
that local, state, and federal governments employ 21,831,255 people), available at 
http://factfinder.census.gov/rest/dnldController/deliver?_ts=437686905107. 
 2  W. Bradley Wendel, Dedication to Professor Ray Forrester: Free Speech for 
Lawyers, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 305, 313 (2001). 
 3  Id. at 344. 
 4  See David L. Hudson Jr., Balancing Act: Public Employees and Free Speech, 3 
FIRST REPORTS 1, 4 (2002). 
 5  134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014). 
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testimony outside the course of their ordinary job responsibilities.”6  The 
unanimous Lane decision, which affirmed in part and reversed in part an 
opinion by the Eleventh Circuit, held that the First Amendment protects a 
public employee from retaliatory employer discipline where the employee 
testifies at trial, pursuant to a subpoena, and when such testimony is not 
required by his or her duties as an employee.  However, the Court also 
ruled that the public employer in Lane could not be held liable in his 
individual capacity for damages because he enjoyed qualified immunity 
from suit.7  Lane adds its voice to the preexisting Pickering v. Board of 
Education8 and Garcetti v. Ceballos9 frameworks of public employee 
speech.  Lane is important because it further clarifies the Court’s public 
employee speech doctrine, while also providing more definite limits to 
Garcetti by asking whether the speech “is itself ordinarily within the scope 
of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties.”10 
But while Lane clarifies that a public employee cannot be terminated 
for providing “truthful sworn testimony, compelled by subpoena, outside 
the course of his ordinary job responsibilities,”11 the question of how far 
that protection will extend remains open.  The Lane Court explicitly 
declined to address “whether truthful sworn testimony would constitute 
citizen speech under Garcetti when given as part of a public employee’s 
ordinary job duties.”12  Thus, Lane would not cover situations involving a 
police officer or crime scene technician who may testify in the course of 
their ordinary job duties.13  While Lane’s application of the Pickering 
framework gives guidance to public employers when weighing the First 
Amendment interests of employees subpoenaed to testify outside the scope 
of their ordinary job duties with the interests of the government as an 
employer, Lane also leaves unanswered significant public employee speech 
questions for public employees that may find themselves testifying as a part 
of their ordinary job responsibilities. 
I.     THE MAJORITY OPINION 
The plaintiff in Lane was Edward Lane, the former Director of the 
Community Intensive Training for Youth (hereinafter CITY) program at 
Central Alabama Community College (CACC); Lane was hired in 2006, 
 
 6  Id. at 2377. 
 7  Id. at 2383. 
 8  391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 9  547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 10  134 S. Ct. at 2379. 
 11  Id. at 2378. 
 12  Id. at 2378 n.4. 
 13  Id. at 2384 (Thomas, J., concurring).  The concurrence offers these examples as 
employees whose speech rights remain unsettled under Lane. 
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during a time when CITY faced “significant financial difficulties.”14  As 
part of his duties as Director, Lane conducted an extensive audit of the 
CITY program’s expenses.15  During the course of his audit, he discovered 
a woman on the payroll—Alabama State Representative Suzanne 
Schmitz—had not been reporting for work at the CITY office.16  Lane 
informed Steve Franks, then-President of CACC, about Schmitz’s failure to 
report.  In response, Franks warned Lane that terminating Schmitz’s 
employment at CITY could have negative consequences.17  Lane 
terminated Schmitz’s employment and shortly thereafter the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) initiated an investigation into Schmitz’s 
employment with CITY.18 
The FBI’s investigation led to Schmitz’s indictment on federal charges 
of mail fraud and theft in connection with a program in receipt of federal 
funds.19  In the case against her, Lane testified, under subpoena, before a 
federal grand jury about the events surrounding Schmitz’s termination and 
his reasons for firing her.20  Lane testified both in Schmitz’s August 2008 
trial and her retrial six months later.21  Upon retrial, the jury convicted 
Schmitz, sentenced her to thirty months’ imprisonment, and ordered her to 
pay more than $177,000 in restitution.22 
In January 2009, President Franks terminated Lane and twenty-eight 
other CITY employees in an alleged effort to address budget problems.23  
Franks rescinded all but two termination decisions a few days later, but did 
not rescind Lane’s termination.24  Franks claimed he did not rescind Lane’s 
termination due to ambiguity in Lane’s employee status.25  Lane 
 
 14  Id. at 2375. 
 15  Id.  
 16  Id.  
 17  “CACC’s president and its attorney . . . warned [Lane] that firing Schmitz could 
have negative repercussions for him and CACC.”  Id.  After her termination, “Schmitz told 
another CITY employee . . . that she intended to ‘get Lane back’” and threatened to fire him 
if he requested money from the state legislature.  Id. (quoting Lane v. Cent. Ala. Cmty. 
Coll., No. CV–11–BE–0883–M, 2012 WL 5289412, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 18, 2012)). 
 18  Id. 
 19  Id.  
 20  Id.   
 21  During Schmitz’s first trial, the jury failed to reach a verdict.  Schmitz was then 
tried again six months later and convicted.  Id.   
 22  Id.  
 23  Id. at 2376. 
 24  Id.  
 25  See id.  Lane recommended to Franks that, in order to address the CITY program’s 
budget shortfalls, he should consider layoffs.  This led Franks to terminate twenty-nine 
probationary CITY employees, including Lane.  Id.   
Shortly thereafter, Franks rescinded all but 2 of the 29 terminations—those of 
Lane and one other employee—because of an “ambiguity in [those other 
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subsequently filed suit against Franks in both his individual and official 
capacities, alleging Franks “violated the First Amendment by firing him in 
retaliation for testifying against Schmitz.”26 
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama granted 
Franks’ motion for summary judgment, finding he was entitled to qualified 
immunity.27  In reaching its decision, the district court relied on Garcetti v. 
Ceballos,28 “which held that ‘when public employees make statements 
pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens 
for First Amendment purposes.’”29  The district court’s decision noted that, 
although there were “genuine issues of material fact” concerning Franks’ 
“true” motivation for terminating Lane’s employment, “a reasonable 
government official in [] Franks’ position would not have had reason to 
believe that the Constitution protected Mr. Lane’s testimony.”30   
 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court, relying “extensively” 
on Garcetti.31  The Eleventh Circuit concluded that Lane’s speech fell into 
a category of employee speech outside the protection of the First 
Amendment because it came into “existence [because of] the employee’s 
professional responsibilities.”32  However, the Eleventh Circuit determined 
that “‘even if . . . a constitutional violation of Lane’s First Amendment 
rights occurred in these circumstances, Franks would be entitled to 
qualified immunity in his personal capacity’ because the right at issue had 
not been clearly established.”33  
In an opinion authored by Justice Sotomayor, the Supreme Court 
reversed in part and affirmed in part the opinion of the Eleventh Circuit.  
The Court began by concisely framing the legal issue raised in Lane: 
“whether the First Amendment protects a public employee who provided 
truthful sworn testimony, compelled by subpoena, outside the course of his 
 
employees’] probationary service.”  Franks claims that he “did not rescind Lane’s 
termination . . . because he believed that Lane was in a fundamentally different 
category than the other employees: he was the director of the entire CITY 
program, and not simply an employee [who could be fired at will].”  
Id. (first and second alterations in original) (citations omitted). 
 26  Id.  
 27  Id. (citing Lane v. Cent. Ala. Cmty. Coll., 2012 WL 5289412, at *12 (N.D. Ala. 
Oct. 18, 2012)). 
 28  547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 29  Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2376 (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421). 
 30  Lane, 2012 WL 5289412, at *6, *12. 
 31  Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2376. 
 32  Lane v. Cent. Ala. Cmty. Coll., 523 F. App’x 709, 711 (11th Cir. 2013) (regarding 
Franks’ official capacity, the court in its decision did “not resolve, however, the claims 
against Burrow—initially brought against Franks when he served as president of CACC—in 
her official capacity.”).  The Court remanded the case to the Eleventh Circuit for further 
proceedings. 
 33  Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2377 (quoting Lane, 523 F. App’x at 711 n. 2). 
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ordinary job responsibilities.”34  In holding that the First Amendment did 
indeed protect such speech, the Court began with the basic premise that 
“speech by citizens on matters of public concern lies at the heart of the 
First Amendment.”35   
Although the government has unique interests as an employer, 
individuals “do not renounce their citizenship” when they take up an 
employment position with the government.36  The Court recognized the 
inherent tension between the interests of the employee as a citizen and the 
interest of the state as an employer.  While government employees have 
interests in protecting their constitutional rights to free speech, government 
employers have legitimate interests in promoting efficiency and integrity, 
and maintaining discipline within the workplace.37  The Court characterizes 
this tension as a struggle to determine “whether the government had ‘an 
adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other 
member of the public’ based on the government’s needs as an employer.”38  
In an attempt to determine which interests “tip[ped] the balance,”39 the 
Court turned to its precedent in Pickering v. Board of Education, which 
involved a teacher’s letter to a newspaper about a school budget.40  In 
Pickering, the Court found the teacher’s speech to be on a matter of public 
concern.41  It also held that the publication of the letter did not impede or 
interfere with the teacher’s performance or the school’s operation, and so 
could not supply grounds for dismissal.42  The Court acknowledged that the 
government’s interest in controlling its workplace must be properly 
balanced against an employee’s interest “as a citizen, in commenting upon 
matters of public concern.”43  But it concluded that “[h]ere, the employer’s 
side of the Pickering scale [was] entirely empty” because Franks and 
CACC could not demonstrate any government interest that tipped the 
balance in their favor.44 
The Lane Court then turned to the framework established in Garcetti 
in order to distinguish between employee speech and citizen speech.  
 
 34  Id. at 2378. 
 35  Id. at 2377. 
 36  Id. 
 37  Id. at 2381 (“[G]overnment employers have legitimate ‘interests in the effective 
and efficient fulfillment of their responsibilities to the public’, including ‘promot[ing] 
efficiency and integrity in the discharge of official duties,’ and ‘maintain[ing] proper 
discipline in public service.’” (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983)). 
 38  Id. at 2377 (quoting Garcetti, 547 U. S. at 418). 
 39  Id. 
 40  Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 41  Id. at 571. 
 42  Id. at 572–74. 
 43  Id. at 568. 
 44  Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2377.  
2014] L A N E  V .  F R A N K S  47 
Garcetti articulated a two-step inquiry to determine whether a public 
employee’s speech is entitled to First Amendment protection: 
The first [step] requires determining whether the employee spoke as a 
citizen on a matter of public concern.  If the answer is no, the employee 
has no First Amendment cause of action based on his or her employer’s 
reaction to the speech.  If the answer is yes, then the possibility of a 
First Amendment claim arises.  The question becomes whether the 
relevant government entity had an adequate justification for treating the 
employee differently from any other member of the general public.45 
Garcetti involved an internal memorandum prepared by a prosecutor, 
which the Court held the First Amendment did not protect because it was 
prepared as part of the prosecutor’s ordinary job duties.46  Importantly, the 
Court differentiated between citizen speech—which may trigger 
constitutional protection—and unprotected statements made by public 
employees pursuant to their official duties.  Per Garcetti, the Constitution 
does not insulate these types of public employee communications from 
employer discipline because it is not speech made as a citizen for First 
Amendment purposes. 
Addressing the facts before it, the Lane Court first examined whether 
Lane’s testimony constituted speech as a private citizen on a matter of 
public concern.  The decisive question in Garcetti turns on whether the 
speech at issue is ordinarily “within the scope of an employee’s duties.”47  
Speech that is ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties 
constitutes employee speech and remains outside the protections of the 
First Amendment.  The Court easily found Lane’s speech to be speech as a 
private citizen because 
sworn testimony in judicial proceedings is a quintessential example of 
speech as a citizen for a simple reason:  Anyone who testifies in court 
bears an obligation, to the court and society at large, to tell the 
truth.  When the person testifying is a public employee, he may bear 
separate obligations to his employer—for example, an obligation not to 
show up to court dressed in an unprofessional manner.  But any such 
obligations as an employee are distinct and independent from the 
obligation, as a citizen, to speak the truth.  That independent obligation 
renders sworn testimony speech as a citizen and sets it apart from 
speech made purely in the capacity of an employee.48 
The Court distinguished between Garcetti’s internal memorandum and 
Lane’s sworn testimony by noting that, unlike Garcetti’s internal 
memorandum, Lane’s testimony about the facts surrounding Schmitz’s 
 
 45  Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2378 (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418 (citations omitted)). 
 46  Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424. 
 47  Id. 
 48  Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379 (citation omitted). 
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termination was compelled by subpoena and was not distinctly “ordinarily 
within the scope of an employee’s duties.”49  The fact that Lane’s 
testimony concerned information acquired through his employment and 
that it involved his employment duties did not “transform” his testimony 
into employment speech.50  The Court then rebuked the Eleventh Circuit 
for failing to distinguish Lane’s speech from that in Garcetti, causing the 
Eleventh Circuit to read “Garcetti far too broadly.”51  The Court’s strong 
language served to emphasize both the importance of First Amendment 
protection for sworn testimony as citizen speech, as well as the Court’s 
defined—and somewhat limited—scope of Garcetti. 
The Court also drew attention to the importance of affording 
protection to public employee speech in the case of “a public corruption 
scandal.”52  Citing its recent decision in Snyder v. Phelps, the Court noted 
that speech of public concern “can ‘be fairly considered as relating to any 
matter of political, social, or other concern to the community,’ or when it 
‘is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest 
and of value and concern to the public.’”53  Given that Lane provided 
compelled testimony in a case against a state representative involving 
corruption of a public program, misuse of state funds,54 extensive press 
coverage55 and resulting in substantial restitution,56 the Court found that 
Lane’s speech “obviously” involved a matter of significant public 
concern.57 
However, the Court stopped short of granting categorical First 
Amendment protection for a public employee’s sworn testimony as a 
citizen on a matter of public concern.58  Instead, the Court applied the 
Pickering balancing test.59  Under Pickering, even if an employee speaks as 
a citizen on a matter of public concern, the Court must still determine 
whether the interest of the employee or government should prevail in cases 
where the government seeks to curtail its employees’ speech.  This 
determination “depends on a careful balance ‘between the interests of the 
[employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern 
and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of 
 
 49  Id. 
 50  Id. 
 51  Id. 
 52  Id. at 2380. 
 53  Id. (citing Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1211 (2011)). 
 54  Id. 
 55  Id. at 2375. 
 56  Id. 
 57  Id. at 2380. 
 58  Id. 
 59  Id. at 2377. 
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the public services it performs through its employees.’”60  Here, the Court 
looked to whether the government took action based on its legitimate 
interests as an employer,61 and found that the government failed to show 
adequate justification for Franks’ retaliatory termination of Lane.  
Remarking that “the employer’s side of the Pickering scale [was] entirely 
empty,” the Court held Lane’s speech was entitled to First Amendment 
protection.62 
On the question of qualified immunity, the Lane Court agreed with the 
lower courts that then-President Franks enjoyed qualified immunity from 
suit, and therefore dismissed the claims against him in his individual 
capacity for damages.63  Citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, the Court reaffirmed 
the principle that “qualified immunity ‘gives government officials 
breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open 
legal questions.’”64  The Court began by identifying the relevant question 
for qualified immunity in this case: “Could Franks reasonably have 
believed, at the time he fired Lane, that a government employer could fire 
an employee on account of testimony the employee gave, under oath and 
outside the scope of his ordinary job responsibilities?”65  The Court ruled 
that, although Lane’s speech fell within the protection of the First 
Amendment, the unsettled precedent within the Courts of Appeal at the 
time that Franks terminated Lane’s employment required a grant of 
qualified immunity.  The Court reiterated that the pertinent analytical 
inquiry was: whether “Franks [could] reasonably have believed, at the time 
he fired Lane, that a government employer could fire an employee on 
account of testimony the employee gave, under oath and outside the scope 
of his ordinary job responsibilities.”66  In determining whether qualified 
immunity was appropriate, the Court analyzed the state of the law in the 
Eleventh Circuit at the time Franks made his termination decision.  
Because of discrepancies in Eleventh Circuit caselaw67 and that of the other 
 
 60  Id. at 2377 (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Ed., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)). 
 61  Such as “promot[ing] efficiency and integrity in the discharge of official duties, 
and maintain[ing] proper discipline in public service.”  Id. at 2381 (quoting Connick v. 
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150–51 (1983)) (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted). 
 62  Id. at 2381. 
 63  Id. 
 64  Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011)).  
 65  Id. 
 66  Id. at 2382. 
 67  Id.  Highlighting the various Eleventh Circuit precedents at issue, the Court noted:  
Morris, Martinez, and Tindal represent the landscape of Eleventh Circuit 
precedent the parties rely on for qualified immunity purposes.  If Martinez and 
Tindal were controlling in the Eleventh Circuit in 2009, we would agree with 
Lane that Franks could not reasonably have believed that it was lawful to fire 
Lane in retaliation for his testimony.  But both cases must be read together with 
Morris, which reasoned—in declining to afford First Amendment protection—that 
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courts of appeals, the question of whether Franks could terminate Lane’s 
employment based on his testimony “was not beyond debate at the time 
Franks acted.”68  Thus, the claims against Franks in his individual capacity 
must be dismissed.69  
II.     JUSTICE THOMAS’S CONCURRENCE 
Justice Thomas penned a two-paragraph concurring opinion, which 
Justices Scalia and Alito joined, in order to stress the limited application of 
the Court’s decision.  He noted that Lane provided “no occasion to address 
the quite different question whether a public employee speaks ‘as a citizen’ 
when he testifies in the course of his ordinary job responsibilities.”70  The 
concurring opinion asserted that Lane “requires little more than a 
straightforward application of Garcetti”71: Lane testified in a manner that 
was neither pursuant to job duties, nor done to fulfill a work responsibility, 
which means he spoke “as a citizen” and was entitled to constitutional 
protection.72 
Justice Thomas also drew attention to the majority’s failure to address 
the level of First Amendment protection, if any, afforded public employees 
who give testimony as part of their ordinary job duties.73  The Lane 
majority noted that “Lane’s ordinary job responsibilities did not include 
testifying in court proceedings . . . We accordingly need not address in this 
case whether truthful sworn testimony would constitute citizen speech 
under Garcetti when given as part of a public employee’s ordinary job 
duties, and express no opinion on the matter today.”74  While the 
concurring opinion refrained from clarifying the scope of Lane’s First 
Amendment protection, by explicitly distinguishing Lane’s testimony from 
that of a police officer or crime scene technician—employees who may 
find themselves testifying in the course of their ordinary job duties—
 
the plaintiff’s decision to testify was motivated solely by his desire to comply with 
a subpoena. 
Id. (citing Morris v. Crow, 142 F. 3d 1379 (1998) (per curiam); Martinez v. Opa-Locka, 971 
F. 2d 708 (1992) (per curiam); Tindal v. Montgomery Cty. Comm’n, 32 F. 3d 1535 (1994)). 
 68  Id. at 2374.  It is worth noting that the Court placed weight on the fact that the 
Third and Seventh Circuit precedents were “in direct conflict with Eleventh Circuit 
precedent.”  Id.  This direct conflict undermined Lane’s argument that the Third and 
Seventh Circuit precedents should have put Franks on notice that firing Lane was 
unconstitutional. 
 69  Id. at 2383. 
 70  Id. at 2384 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 71  Id. at 2383. 
 72  Id.  
 73  Id. at 2384; accord id. at 2378 n.4 (majority opinion). 
 74  Id. at 2378 n.4. (majority opinion). 
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Justice Thomas highlighted the open question that remains for the Court’s 
future consideration.75  
III.     ANALYSIS 
At this point, it is worth considering whether there is any meaningful 
difference between Lane’s testimony and that provided by police officers 
and crime scene technicians.  Should the Lane rule apply to employees who 
testify as part of their ordinary job duties?  One might imagine a scenario 
where a police officer is subpoenaed and testifies—in the course of his 
ordinary job responsibilities—and is later terminated.  Such a case could 
fall squarely under Garcetti because the employee’s testimony can be 
viewed as parallel to the prosecutor’s internal memorandum.  Under 
Garcetti, “[t]he fact that [an employee’s] duties sometimes required him to 
speak or write does not mean that his supervisors were prohibited from 
evaluating his performance.”76  Moreover, when police officers or crime 
scene technicians testify, their testimony “is itself ordinarily within the 
scope of [their] duties, not…merely concern[ing] those duties.”77  Lane 
acknowledges Garcetti’s emphasis on the “government’s needs as an 
employer.”78  Taking away the government employer’s ability to terminate 
an employee for actions taken in the course of their ordinary job duties 
would certainly infringe on the government’s ability to effectively hire and 
fire.  Thus, a court could conclude that the officer’s testimony was not 
protected.  
However, the Lane Court made clear that providing “[s]worn 
testimony in judicial proceedings is a quintessential example of speech as a 
citizen.”79  Although Garcetti held that when a public employee speaks 
pursuant to his official duties he is not speaking as a citizen, the fact that 
someone is a police officer or crime scene technician in no way diminishes 
his or her “obligation, to the court and society at large, to tell the truth.  
That obligation is distinct and independent from any separate obligations a 
testifying public employee might have to his employer.”80   
 Even if a court was unwilling to find the officer’s speech to be 
“speech as a citizen,” there are sufficient reasons to apply Lane’s protection 
to sworn testimony by employees who testify in the course of their ordinary 
job duties.  First, extending Lane to provide First Amendment protection 
for public employees who testify as part of their ordinary job duties 
meaningfully protects sworn testimony.  Furthermore, the fact that an 
 
 75  Id. at 2384 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 76  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006).  
 77  Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2381 (majority opinion). 
 78  Id. 
 79  Id. at 2379. 
 80  Id. 
52 N O T R E  D A M E  L A W  R E V I E W  O N L I N E  [VOL. 90:1 
officer testifies to “fulfill a work responsibility” is not significantly 
distinguishable from the compelled sworn testimony in Lane.  An officer’s 
obligation to be truthful remains, and the government employer’s interest in 
hiring and firing does not outweigh the need for officers to offer truthful 
sworn testimony without fear of repercussion.81  Finally, the idea that a 
police officer could be terminated for providing truthful sworn testimony is 
somewhat troubling because testifying is often a “critical part of . . . 
employment duties.”82  There remains something deeply unsettling about 
the notion that police officers or crime scene technicians are essentially 
required to testify—as a critical part of their job—but could be terminated 
for their truthful sworn testimony.  
CONCLUSION 
Lane is notable for two distinct reasons: (1) it helps clarify the 
distinction between citizen speech and employee speech in situations 
involving subpoenaed testimony, and (2) it provides defined limits to the 
scope of Garcetti.  In further outlining the First Amendment protections 
afforded public employees, the case both affirms the free speech rights of 
those employees and provides guidance to public employers in weighing 
the First Amendment interests of their employees against their own 
interests. 
Yet, while Lane provides guidance to public employers, employees 
should take care to note the caveats built into Lane opinion, particularly 
with respect to the type of testimony at issue.  The Court emphasized that 
in the facts before it “[t]here [was] no evidence . . . that Lane’s testimony at 
Schmitz’ trials was false or erroneous or that Lane unnecessarily disclosed 
any sensitive, confidential, or privileged information while testifying.”83  
This language leaves open the possibility that if an employee gave 
testimony that “unnecessarily disclosed any sensitive, confidential, or 
privileged information,” a government employer could be justified in 
terminating that employee, based on its legitimate needs as an employer.  
At the same time, however, if sworn testimony is a “quintessential example 
of speech as a citizen” and a witness “bears an obligation . . . to tell the 
truth,” an employer may find it difficult to argue that information given 
under compelled testimony was unnecessarily disclosed.  It would appear 
that, although not all sworn testimony falls under the protection of the First 
Amendment, under Lane all “truthful subpoenaed testimony outside the 
course of their ordinary job responsibilities”84 would enjoy protection.  
Thus, public employers should be extremely careful when considering 
 
 81  Id. at 2384 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421). 
 82  Id.  
 83  Id. at 2381 (majority opinion).  
 84  Id. at 2377. 
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termination on the basis of “unnecessary disclosure” in subpoenaed 
testimony because Lane illustrates the difficulty that accompanies a public 
employer’s duty to properly balance the First Amendment interests of 
employees and the interests of the government as an employer. 
Lane also reaffirms the premise that government employers whose 
actions are not precluded by clear legal precedent enjoy qualified immunity 
because qualified immunity exists for those government officials charged 
with making employment decisions when there are discrepancies in the 
law.  Although Lane leaves open whether the First Amendment protects the 
speech of government employees called to testify as part of their 
employment obligations, the case nonetheless bolsters the strength of the 
qualified immunity standard that insulates government actors to the point 
that the standard seems “increasingly impenetrable.”85  Ultimately, the 
defense of qualified immunity, as outlined in Lane, remains for government 
officials unless they have violated a clearly established constitutional right. 
 
 
 85  Ruthann Robson, Opinion Analysis: First Amendment Clearly Protects Public 
Employee’s Subpoenaed Testimony—But Not Sufficiently Clearly to Overcome Qualified 
Immunity, SCOTUSBLOG (June 19, 2014, 3:11 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/opinion-analysis-first-amendment-clearly-protects-
public-employees-subpoenaed-testimony-but-not-sufficiently-clearly-to-overcome-
qualified-immunity/. 
